Under the hood of TVIX and XIV—Cause for Concern

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2012 | Vance Harwood
 

Since Credit Suisse’s recent pause on TVIX share creations I have been trying to figure out some of the hedging / rebalancing dynamics underlying the current crop of volatility ETNs and ETFs.  Traditional equity ETFs like SPY, the S&P 500 index tracking  fund don’t  require much behind-the-scenes action.   Shares are created or redeemed in conjuction with baskets of securities changing hands.  The only dynamic part is when the S&P index itself adds or deletes stocks or perhaps shuffling of shares for tax purposes.

Volatility ETNs/ETFs on the other hand use VIX futures, which themselves have only been in existence 8 years, as the underlying securities.   Rather than statically holding onto these futures all volatility funds must continually roll their futures holdings from nearer month maturities to further out months so that their effective time maturity stays constant.  In addition, except for Barclays’ offerings all inverse & leveraged volatility funds are designed to track the daily percentage move of their underlying index.  This attribute requires the funds to rebalance their holdings as often as daily to maintain their percentage tracking.     ETNs have some leeway on how they do this management of the underlying futures.  They for example can adjust the amount of hedging they have to do based on their overall portfolio (e.g., assets in XIV would partially hedge TVIX).

ETFs (e.g., ProShares UVXY 2X short term) require actual futures to change hands when shares are created or redeemed, but once held by the ETF provider they still have to do the dynamic rolling / rebalancing on the portfolio.  What you get back will be different than what you put in…

I’m concerned that the volatility ETN/ETFs are moving the market  itself with their trading: futures prices, term structure, and perhaps even the IV skew of SPX options.    It can’t help that the futures market rebalancing required to hedge vega, the volatilty of volatility, is in the same direction for both long funds like TVIX as it is for XIV and other inverse funds—the vega risk does not offset.    While scary, my analysis on the topic suggests that big VIX futures purchases probably have an overall neutral effect on the market.  The hedging activities of the market makers tend to offset the effects of VIX futures creation.

Volatility is a new asset class, and clearly it has gotten big enough to start showing growing pains.   I’m confident that the quest for profits will lead to solutions for these problems, but it will take some time to sort this all out.  I applaud Credit Suisse for having the internal controls and the willingness to take action when they saw the asset size exceed their limit.

 


Is XIV behaving correctly?

Thursday, August 25th, 2011 | Vance Harwood
 

In spite of its name, XIV is not the inverse of the VIX index—it is the daily percentage inverse of a index called SPVXSP, which you can monitor on Bloomberg here.  This index very closely tracks the same index that VXX uses, SPVXSTR.

Last week XIV did not track VXX’s daily moves particularly well.   There has been a lot of speculation about what was causing this disruption—ranging from turmoil in the futures markets, XIV’s daily re-balancing, to the heavy backwardation in the soon-to-expire August volatility futures.

Below I have ploted VXX and XIV against the values they should have based on the index:

VXX & XIV vs SPVXSTR, click to enlarge

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Things do not look seriously out of wack.  Most importantly, we aren’t seeing a divergence between the index and the VXX/XIV prices.  Daily errors are being compensated for over time. The next graph shows the daily VXX/XIV divergence from the index in percent.   The interesting thing here is that VXX is having trouble tracking too—it’s just in the positive direction.

VXX and XIV tracking error, click to enlarge.

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Looking at these graphs I’m inclined to say that the tracking problems are not specific to XIV, but rather due to the volatility/disruption of the futures market associated with the S&P downgrade.

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IVOP and XIV termination events

Monday, January 21st, 2013 | Vance Harwood
 

In the prospectuses for IVOP and XIV, there are some disconcerting discussions about termination events. In the case of IVOP, it occurs if its value drops below $10 and for XIV it is triggered if the daily percentage drop exceeds 80%. I did some digging into these events to try and figure out how likely they are to occur.  If you’d like to read a more general discussion about these two ETNs you can read this post.

First of all the IVOP and XIV provisions for termination/acceleration relate to volatility futures not the CBOE’s VIX index. The VIX relates to the instantaneous implied volatility of the S&P 500—which is a different thing. Volatility futures have contracts with different expiration dates. Typically the further out their expiration dates (e.g., 6 months from now), the slower they react to the day-to-day moves of the market. IVO and XIV are based on the two futures contracts that are closest to expiration, the administrators for these funds adjust their positions in these contracts daily to achieve an effective average time till expiration of 30 days.

VXX does the same thing, except it is trying to be long volatility, not short/daily inverse % of volatility. When trying to understand IVOP or XIV you can view them as being a short position in VXX (IVOP), or tracking the opposite daily percentage move of VXX (XIV).

VXX is not as volatile as the VIX index. On a day with sharp market moves VXX will typically move about half the percentage move of what VIX does. VXX can still make big moves however—one day during the May 2010 Flash Crash, it jumped almost 25%—the VIX on that day jumped 46%.

Now we can talk about termination / acceleration. I think it is reasonable to assume that the goals of the ETN providers in including these measures are to:

  • Prevent the ETN value from going negative (they specify in these prospectuses that the value will stay positive)
  • Protect the provider from undue market risk in hedging these products during volatile times

IVOP is essentially a short position in VXX, and Barclays doesn’t want to ever lose more than was put into it, so they liquidate the fund if it drops below $10 on the market. This termination would occur if VXX climbs 50% above its value when IVOP was created—jumping from $41.55 to approximately $63.

With XIV termination (or “acceleration” in marketing speak) relates to daily percentage moves. If VXX jumped more than 100% in a day, then if VelocityShares didn’t terminate XIV its notational value could go to zero.   They avoid this particular unhappy situation by terminating the fund if the daily move of VXX is 80% or more—although losing 80% in one day would still be plenty traumatic.

Just to be clear, these funds aren’t tied directly to VXX, but rather the underlying futures contracts, but I believe VXX is a good proxy for the situation.

The termination risk for XIV appears to be limited to market crashes worse than the Flash crash. Two examples that come to mind are the 2009 crash and the October 1987 crash. VXX didn’t exist for either of these. I have analyzed VIX data (or simulated data) since 1992—there were 20 days with VIX jumping over 30% (previous day close to intraday high) during that period. The highest percentage jump over that period was 70.5% on February 27, 2007. There were three days with VIX jumps over 30% in the 2008/2009 crash, and during the Flash Crash.

If VXX had existed during this time span, and held to its typical behavior of 50% of VIX’s move it looks like the XIV termination event would not have occurred, but obviously it would have taken heavy losses on those days.

The termination risks for IVOP (and its fallen sibling IVO) are obviously higher.   All it takes is an absolute 50% rise in the SPXVSTR index from its value at IVOP’s inception to kill the fund.

In IVO and IVOP’s case it matters when the fund was initiated, because VXX going up 50% over the case of a correction/crash is common.  IVO started January 20th, 2011, when the VIX index was a relatively low 18.   The VIX index at IVOP’s inception was at 31,  so the timing seems to be better—assuming we don’t go into a 2009 style crash in the next 6 months or so.

If you are investing significant amounts of money in these products it looks prudent to at least hold some OTM VIX or VXX  calls. These would provide some insurance against these infrequent, but dramatic events.

Thanks to Steve, who commented on the first version of this post pointing out that the ETN providers were probably not looking out for the investor, but rather for their own hides in incorporating these termination events.

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Inverse volatility—the winner for Short Term is XIV

Tuesday, February 19th, 2013 | Vance Harwood
 

I used to share stock tips with my brother-in-laws. Before the tech crash I could offer up a few stocks I liked, and they would often make some money.  The crash painfully ended the easy money and I moved onto index funds. They didn’t think indexes were near as much fun.

This Easter one of my brother-in-laws asked what I was investing in.   My response was “inverse volatility.” I might as well have said pixie dust.  I stood there wondering where (or if) to start.   First you have stocks, then you have the S&P 500, then you options on the S&P 500, then you have implied volatility calculations, then you have futures on volatility, then you have ETNs with rolling mixtures of futures on volatilty (VXX), and then you have the inverse (or the short) of that.   We looked each other in the eye and wordlessly agreed that we wouldn’t start.

I like inverse VXX/VXZ investing.  It’s seldom boring and over the long run the advantage is on your side. Volatility has a return to mean behavior, and volatility futures are almost always in contango—which erodes the value of VXX. If you buy inverse volatility when the VIX is relatively high, your chances of making a good profit eventually are very good.

Currently there are only three viable choices in inverse volatility ETN/ETFs.  VelocityShares offers XIV (daily percentage inverse of VXX), and ZIV (daily percentage inverse of medium term VXZ)—both ETNs, and ProShares offers SVXY—same as XIV except it is an ETF.

Barclays offers the XXV and IVOP ETNs which emulate short positions in VXX, but they are essentially dead funds, with very low leverage and volume.   I don’t recommend them.  For the reasons why see this post.

In rating the Barclays, VelocityShare, and ProShares funds I think there are  four primary factors:

  • Liquidity (small bid-asked spreads, getting good fills on orders)
  • Leverage
  • Risk
  • Tax treatment

ZIV’s daily volume is generally less than 10,000 , and its spread runs in the 7 to 10 cent range—not great, but it can handle good size trades (thousands of shares), without getting jerked around.   Recently ZIV has been my primary trading vehicle for inverse volatility.  Lots of zip, with lower drawdown risk than the short term products.   For more on ZIV see Trading Inverse Volatility with a Simple Ratio.

On leverage  XIV and SVXY are simple, there goal is negative one-to-one for VXX’s daily percentage moves. The leverage of XXV and IVOP is not so simple.

It turns out that the daily percentage leverage of a short position is a variable which changes as the equity changes in price. For example, if you short XYZ stock at $100, the first $1 move either way delivers 1X leverage—you gain or lose $1,which is +-1/100 = +- 1% . But the further you get from that initiating price, the more the daily leverage changes.

For example, imagine after you sell XYZ short at $100 it drops like a rock to $2/share. If it drops the next day from $2 to $1.5, it’s a 25% daily move—but the value of your short position only changes from $98  to $98.5 per share. That’s a 0.5% move and the leverage, 0.5%/25% is only  0.02X. Conversely, if XYZ moves to $150 after you short it at $100, a $1 daily move down (0.67%) changes your position value from $50/share to $51/share—a 2% move which is  2%/.67% = 3X leverage. The graph below shows this relationship.

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XXV, IVOP, XIV leverage vs VXX, click to enlarge

The drop off to zero leverage on IVOP and XXV  is Barclays’  ”Automatic Termination Event” that stops out their inverse funds if they drop  below $10 per share. This prevents these funds from going negative. This termination is a real risk for the Barclay products, IVO was terminated in September 2011 when VXX went above $49.5 per share.  IVOP will terminate if VXX goes above approximately 63.

Barclays ETNs only have 1X leverage when VXX is at their inception price, which is 41.55 for IVOP and 108.03 (split adjusted) for XXV. I think this is a terrible aspect of Barclays’ funds.  When things are going in your favor (volatility dropping) your leverage is dropping, and it climbs rapidly when volatility is spiking—the opposite of what you would like.  This loss of leverage as VXX declines forced Barclays to introduce IVO, because XXV leverage had dropped so low.  In the future as contango grinds away at the VXX value Barclays will need to introduce a follow-on to IVOP to get their leverage back up near the 1X range. XIV is a clear winner on leverage.

Regarding risk, these are volatile products. They will get hammered when volatility spikes up. In the August/September 2011 correction XIV dropped from 19 to 6.5, a 66% drop in a few weeks. If the market goes into a major bear mode it might take a long time to recover your losses. Recent history has shown that daily percentage funds like XIV weather volatility spikes better than true shorts like IVOP, or the departed IVO.  XIV is a clear winner on termination risk—it is much less likely to automatically stop out investors.  See this post for more information on termination.

Although all inverse volatility funds benefit from the normal contango term structure of volatility futures,  they aren’t reasonable buy and hold choices for investors.  Investors should hedge, or go to the sidelines if the market looks “toppy”.   All your gains can evaporate in a big hurry if the market corrects or crashes.

Will Barclays respond to XIV’s growing success by introducing a 1X leverage fund? I doubt it. They have a great situation with XXV and IVOP—every dollar invested in these funds is a perfect hedge against their other short term volatility product: VXX.   They can skip the hedging expenses on both sides because they hedge each other, and Barclay can collect their 0.89% annual fee, risk free.

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Major bear insurance for a XIV position

Monday, March 7th, 2011 | Vance Harwood
 

I have been loading up heavily in XIV during this correction.   I certainly haven’t been bored, watching big gains one day go away the next, but the contango associated with VXX is currently structural—so as long as that situation continues XIV, which is short contango, will be a long term winner.

If this correction turns out to be more than the minor setbacks we’ve seen recently, or the beginning of a bear phase of the market, it might be a while before my XIV positions will be profitable again.   I can console myself with the knowledge that my overall portfolio will not suffer much, but it would be nice to have something to kick in if the market really tanks.

Two ideas:

  • VIX OTM back spread in a one short lower strike call and two long higher strike calls ratio.  Cheap or free if the spread is big enough.  Would pay off well in a full fledged panic
  • Set a VIX threshold that if breached would trigger buying something that tracks the VIX reasonably well—like TVIX.  The goal would be to capture the front end “panic phase” of the correction, and exit once the VIX started its mean reverting relaxation.

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